KC and the Sunshine Band Royalties Battle Hits a Legal High Note
By: JOHN CASELLA, ESQUIRE
In a headline-grabbing Florida copyright dispute, the Third District Court of Appeal delivered a decision that blends vintage disco music with modern-day copyright litigation. On April 9, 2025, the court affirmed a lower court’s refusal to hold Richard R. Finch and his attorney Evan Cohen in contempt over their attempt to reclaim music royalties assigned over 40 years ago to Harry Wayne Casey, frontman of KC and the Sunshine Band.[1]
This case is a master class in the collision between state court injunctions, federal copyright termination rights, and the boundaries of judicial discretion. For lawyers practicing entertainment law, copyright litigation, or injunction enforcement, the opinion is a roadmap worth studying.
The Original Hit: A 1980s Royalty Agreement and Its Long Legal Tail
Casey and Finch’s professional split in 1983 culminated in a Property Division Agreement transferring all of Finch’s copyright interests and royalty rights in 99 hit songs to Casey. A few years later, in 1986, Casey obtained a state court injunction expressly prohibiting Finch from asserting any rights to those royalties.[2]
When Finch violated that order in 2004 by contacting royalty agencies, Casey returned to court. The judge not only found Finch in contempt but also expanded the injunction to cover any of Finch’s agents or attorneys—a detail that would resurface years later.[3]
The Remix: Section 203 and the Federal Copyright Angle
Beginning in 2012, Finch began asserting rights under Section 203 of the Copyright Act.[4] Section 203 allows an “author” to terminate a previous grant of copyright—such as the 1983 agreement—after 35 years, provided they follow strict notice procedures. In 2021, Finch and Cohen sent termination notices to royalty agencies and filed a federal declaratory judgment action in Florida asserting Finch's rights.
Casey responded by returning to the original Miami-Dade state court and filing a motion to hold both Finch and Cohen in contempt of court, arguing their conduct violated both the 1986 and 2004 injunctions.
The Legal Breakdown: Why the Court Refused Contempt
The trial court disagreed with Casey’s position—and the appellate court backed them up. The Third DCA made clear that the issue wasn’t whether Finch was entitled to Section 203 relief or even whether he was violating the injunctions. The question was narrower: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in deciding not to hold Finch or Cohen in contempt?[5]
Citing established case law, the appellate panel reiterated that courts are not required to issue contempt findings, even when violations are alleged. In this case, the judges concluded that the conduct in question—filing a federal lawsuit and sending Section 203 notices—did not clearly violate the injunctions’ terms, and no Florida precedent dictated otherwise.[6]
Attorney Insight: What This Means for Florida Litigators
This case underscores a few key takeaways:
1. State Court Injunctions Have Limits: Even well-crafted injunctions can’t easily block a party from asserting federal rights, especially when those rights are rooted in federal statutes like Section 203.
2. Contempt Is Discretionary: Florida courts are not bound to issue contempt findings, and appellate courts will rarely disturb a trial judge’s refusal unless it’s patently unreasonable.[7]
3. Injunction Drafting Must Anticipate the Future: Attorneys drafting long-term settlements or injunctions involving intellectual property need to consider the eventual assertion of termination rights under federal law—especially for agreements signed post-1978.
4. Federal Preemption Lurks Beneath the Surface: This case is a textbook example of the friction between state contract enforcement and federal copyright policy. Whether Casey’s state injunctions can preempt Section 203 rights remains unresolved—but clearly, Florida courts are reluctant to use contempt powers to interfere with those claims.
Final Thoughts
Casey v. Finch may not be the final chorus in this long-running feud, but it’s a compelling verse in the broader legal tune of how copyright termination rights interact with legacy royalty agreements and state court enforcement. While the disco era faded, the legal implications of those contracts continue to reverberate through today’s litigation.
Whether you’re representing legacy artists or navigating federal preemption in copyright law, this case is a reminder that time doesn’t always heal old disputes—it can resurrect them.
Footnotes:
[1] Harry Wayne Casey v. Richard R. Finch, et al., Case No. 3D24-0946 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 9, 2025).
2] The 1986 injunction followed Casey’s victory in a declaratory judgment action and specifically barred Finch from asserting royalty rights.
[3] The 2004 injunction went further, enjoining Finch and 'any agent or attorney' from interfering with royalty payments to Casey.
[4] See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2021). Section 203 allows authors to reclaim previously transferred copyrights after 35 years under certain conditions.
[5] The standard of review was 'abuse of discretion.' See Bath Club Ent., LLC v. Residences at the Bath Club Maint. Ass’n, 348 So. 3d 16, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).
[6] The court noted that Casey failed to cite any Florida decision requiring a contempt finding under these circumstances. See Osmo Tec SACV Co. v. Crane Envtl., Inc., 884 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
[7] Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Armand, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D272, 2025 WL 322028 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 29, 2025), quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).